Economic Development Fund : Korea-Japan diplomatic Normalization
The normalization of the ROK-Japan relations and the Korean troop dispatch to Vietnam were two of the main controversial issues during the Jung-hee Park era.
The normalization of the Korea-Japan relations was a result of the U.S. military strategic demand, Japan’s demand for overseas expansion of their capital, and Jung-hee Park’s desire to acquire commerce loans for economic development (Son, Ho-Chul, 1993)
There is an opinion that the ruling blocs of the two countries made an agreement behind closed doors to avoid, rather than resolve, the issues of the past(colonial era). Because of this, Korea, as the victim, could not point an accusatory finger at the factors and personalities responsible for its subjugation, and Japan lost a golden opportunity to apologize.(Lee Won-dok, 1995)
However, despite all the criticisms that were made, the needs of his time compelled Park to lean on Japan, inextricably tying South Korea’s economic future with that of its neighbor. At the time of Park’s ascent to power, the per capita annual GNP stood at $80, only $9 more than its level at the end of the Korean War in 1953. The annual growth rate remained 1.1 percent, the trade deficit hit $310 million, the unemployment rate reached 11.7 percent, and inflation ran at 10.5 percent. Moreover, the United States was decreasing aid to South Korea as part of its global foreign policy to replace grants-in-aid with loans. Hence Park needed an extra source of economic and financial assistance that would be strong enough to support Korea’s first Five-year plan and provide for his own political survival.
Apparently, Park thought history could never be rectified. At best, South Korea had to live in the shadow of its tragic past while trying to put itself on a new track of historical development through Park’s strategy of puguk kang byoung (rich nation, strong army). With regard to Japan, the significance of Park’s rise to power was that, in him, South Korea finally had someone who was not just eager, but actually had the political strength to normalize relations with the country’s former foe and colonial overseer, despite vociferous domestic opposition.
Under the Par regime, to be panil(anti-Japan) was set aside to make way for a more pragmatic but still nationalistic kukil(beat Japan) approach. The normalization of relations with Japan was conceived as an instrument to secure the capital, technology, and markets required for South Korea to catch up with and eventually beat Japan.
After Park succeeded in the normalization, he prepared a bill to promote foreign direct investments.
Jung-hee Park said, “What’s the use of feeling on our racial feelings? We must be willing to learn as Japan humbly learns from the U.S. It’s a time of internalization and the days of national isolation are over. If we keep our distance from a well advanced country like Japan, it will be hard to expect for any development in the near future.”
The normalization of the Korea-Japan relations was a result of the U.S. military strategic demand, Japan’s demand for overseas expansion of their capital, and Jung-hee Park’s desire to acquire commerce loans for economic development (Son, Ho-Chul, 1993)
There is an opinion that the ruling blocs of the two countries made an agreement behind closed doors to avoid, rather than resolve, the issues of the past(colonial era). Because of this, Korea, as the victim, could not point an accusatory finger at the factors and personalities responsible for its subjugation, and Japan lost a golden opportunity to apologize.(Lee Won-dok, 1995)
However, despite all the criticisms that were made, the needs of his time compelled Park to lean on Japan, inextricably tying South Korea’s economic future with that of its neighbor. At the time of Park’s ascent to power, the per capita annual GNP stood at $80, only $9 more than its level at the end of the Korean War in 1953. The annual growth rate remained 1.1 percent, the trade deficit hit $310 million, the unemployment rate reached 11.7 percent, and inflation ran at 10.5 percent. Moreover, the United States was decreasing aid to South Korea as part of its global foreign policy to replace grants-in-aid with loans. Hence Park needed an extra source of economic and financial assistance that would be strong enough to support Korea’s first Five-year plan and provide for his own political survival.
Apparently, Park thought history could never be rectified. At best, South Korea had to live in the shadow of its tragic past while trying to put itself on a new track of historical development through Park’s strategy of puguk kang byoung (rich nation, strong army). With regard to Japan, the significance of Park’s rise to power was that, in him, South Korea finally had someone who was not just eager, but actually had the political strength to normalize relations with the country’s former foe and colonial overseer, despite vociferous domestic opposition.
Under the Par regime, to be panil(anti-Japan) was set aside to make way for a more pragmatic but still nationalistic kukil(beat Japan) approach. The normalization of relations with Japan was conceived as an instrument to secure the capital, technology, and markets required for South Korea to catch up with and eventually beat Japan.
After Park succeeded in the normalization, he prepared a bill to promote foreign direct investments.
Jung-hee Park said, “What’s the use of feeling on our racial feelings? We must be willing to learn as Japan humbly learns from the U.S. It’s a time of internalization and the days of national isolation are over. If we keep our distance from a well advanced country like Japan, it will be hard to expect for any development in the near future.”